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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze Japan’s role in the Asia-Pacific private equity market and 
to predict whether it will increase or decrease in the future. The first step to understanding 
Japan’s role is to assess the health of the global private equity industry by evaluating four key 
vital signs of the private equity industry: the amount of fresh capital contributed by investors, the 
amount of capital deployed by managers in new acquisitions, the amount of capital returned to 
investors after disposition of assets, and the rate of return on equity investments. Once the pulse 
of the industry as a whole is measured, the Asia-Pacific market will be examined independently 
of Europe and the United States using the same indicia of health. Finally, the scope of the 
analysis will be narrowed to only the performance of Japan. After considering all the data, the 
paper will suggest potential reasons for Japan’s poor performance in comparison to its Asia-
Pacific peer countries and explain the Japanese Government’s strategy to remedy the issues.  
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY, LEGAL FORMATION AND BUSINESS 
OPERATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 
 
 Private equity, defined broadly, is. “a source of investment capital from high net worth 
individuals and institutions for the purpose of investing and acquiring equity ownership in 
companies.”1 The idea of using private capital for investment opportunities is said to be, “as old 
as capitalism itself,” but the formation of private equity firms for the specific purpose of 
purchasing controlling stakes in existing businesses is a relatively new tool in the capitalist belt.2 
Indeed, investment professionals did not begin to leave other financial institutions, such as bank 
                                                 
1 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-careers/09/private-equity.asp 
2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204468004577166850222785654 
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holding companies and insurance companies, to form private funds until the late 1970s and early 
1980s.3 Despite its youth, the private equity industry has grown from a cottage industry into a 
multi-trillion-dollar asset class which is large enough to be a major player in the U.S. economy 
and a potential catalyst for world-wide economic development.4 Arguably, this rapid evolution 
was a result of the advent of the American entrepreneurial economy, which is characterized by 
unprecedented business start-ups and expansions, an increase in job creation, and an increase in 
intellectual property and high-tech development.5 This shift caused private equity fund formation 
to geometrically accelerate both in quantity of funds and size of funds. In turn, funds have 
elected to specialize in particular areas in an effort to distinguish themselves from competitors in 
the industry. Commonly, private equity firms will distinguish between: early state businesses 
(venture capital) v. later stage businesses (private equity), high-tech v. lo-tech v. no-tech, mid-
market deals ($50-200m) v. mega deals ($1bn+), U.S. v. Europe v. Asia v. South America, 
successful companies (LBO/Recap) v. troubled companies (debt restructuring/turn around), or 
control v. minority stakes. Additionally, it is common for firms to invest in only one industry, in 
an effort to build expertise and a positive reputation among players in the field.  
It is important to distinguish between a private equity firm and a private equity fund. A 
single private equity firm will likely have several funds within it, each with its own investment 
strategy. After solidifying a strategy, the private equity firm will begin the investment process by 
setting a capital raise goal and soliciting funds from investors to meet this goal. The firm will 
create a fund to hold the capital and pursue the investment objectives. The fund is formed as a 
limited partnership with the firm acting as the general partner (“GP”) of the partnership and the 
                                                 
3 Structing PE Transactions - Levin 
4 http://www.pegcc.org/app/uploads/preqinglobalreport.pdf 
5 Levin Slides 
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investors acting as limited partners (“LPs”) of the partnership.6 Typically, GPs are compensated 
for their business expertise and management of the fund with a management fee equal to 2% of 
aggregate LP commitments and a carried interest bonus equal to 20% of the funds overall net 
profit.7 The LPs exchange a capital commitment letter, which is an agreement in which the LP 
promises to provide capital to the fund when it is “called down” by the GP, for an ownership 
stake in the partnership.8 The number of LPs in a given fund can vary widely and common LPs 
include: accredited individual investors, cash-rich corporations, public & private pension plans, 
university endowments, and charitable endowments.9 Additionally, Non-U.S. individuals, 
corporations, pensions, & sovereign wealth funds are sometimes investors.10  
After completing the formation and capital raise, the GP will source a variety of potential 
purchases over a five-year investment period.11 The number of acquisitions a fund will make 
varies widely based on the total assets of the fund and its stated investment strategy. As deals are 
identified, the GP will submit a capital call to the LPs which will cover the acquisition cost, 
expenses and management fees. After acquisition, the purchased business is referred to as a 
portfolio company, and the firm will monitor portfolio companies across different funds by 
“vintage year” – the year in which the business was acquired determines its vintage year.12 
Depending on the fund strategy and market conditions, the fund may hold a single portfolio 
company anywhere between five and seven years before disposing of the asset. The fund will 
increase the value of the portfolio company by either increasing revenue, reducing costs, or, 
                                                 
6 https://www.financialpoise.com/accreditedinvestormarkets/article/a-brief-history-of-private-equity/ 
7 Levin 
8 https://www.financialpoise.com/accreditedinvestormarkets/article/a-brief-history-of-private-equity/ 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Slide 26 PE 
12 Corp & Ent Finance 
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more likely, a combination of the two. It is common for a fund to increase revenue by growing a 
portfolio company’s market share via strategic acquisitions of competitors, known as tack-on 
acquisitions.13  The fund will dispose of a portfolio company in one of three exit scenarios: an 
initial public offering, a sale of the company to a strategic or financial buyer, or a recapitalization 
where the portfolio company buys back the funds interest in the company.14 The fund will 
distribute proceeds to LPs as each portfolio company is sold. 
 The private equity industry, similar to any other industry, is subject to expansion or 
contraction depending on market conditions. There are four measurable vital signs which aid in 
understanding the current health of the private equity industry. The first vital sign is a measure of 
how much fresh capital LPs are committing to the private equity funds in a given year. The 
second is a measure of how much capital GPs of private equity funds are deploying in new 
acquisitions. The third is a measure of how much capital GPs are returning to investors after 
exiting investment positions. The final, and the most important vital sign to LPs, is the internal 
rate of return on equity investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Also known as, add-on acquisitions. The fund will engage in a strategic purchase of a competitor. 
14 Levin ch. 9 
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III. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
An analysis of the private equity vital signs indicate that the 2015 business year continued a 
trend of strong performance for the industry.15 The following visual from Bain & Company’s 
Global Private Equity Report 2016 succinctly summarizes the data: 
 
This chart isolates data on buyout16 funds from the entire sample of private equity funds. 
Although not as strong as 2014, buyout funds are raising more money, buying more companies 
and selling more companies than in the past. In terms of fund-raising, buyout funds attracted an 
additional $185 billion from investors in 2015.17 Further, funds put an additional $282 billion of 
                                                 
15 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf 
16 Buyout funds are funds which purchase a controlling stake in new acquisitions 
17 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg 1. 
7 
 
investor money to work by acquiring new companies and disposed of $422 billion worth of 
portfolio companies.18  
A. ANALYSIS OF 2015 GLOBAL FUND RAISING EFFORTS 
 
2015 represented ideal conditions for GPs to solicit additional funding from LPs because, 
for the fifth consecutive year, GPs distributed more capital to LPs than LPs contributed to the 
funds.19 Specifically, GPs have distributed $300 billion more capital than they requested via 
capital calls over the last 5 years.20 Moreover, LPs are readily contributing additional capital 
because nearly 50% of current LPs expect the private equity industry to outperform the public 
equity markets by more than 4 percentage points.21 As shown below, the industry, as a whole, 
raised an additional $527 billion of financing in 2015. 
 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg2 
20 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg 5 
21 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pp5  
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 Notably, this data excludes funds which began a capital raise in 2015 but did not 
complete the raise before the end of the year. At the start of 2016, there were 12 funds, 
representing an aggregate capital raise value of $86 billion, which were excluded from this 
calculation.22 
B. ANALYSIS OF 2015 GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS 
  
As mentioned above, the aggregate acquisition value for global buyouts in 2015 was 
$282 billion.23 Although this number is slightly more than the 2014 total of approximately $260 
billion, the quantity of deals closed in 2015 is lower than in 2014. This implies that the uptick in 
deal value may be caused by inflated valuations and not an actual increase in fund activity. 
Indeed, the average EBITDA multiple24 used in buyout transactions hit a record high in the 
United States at valuations equal to 10.1x EBITDA.25 Similarly, the European market EBITDA 
multiple stands at 9.9x.  
There are several possible explanations for the impressive increase in valuations. First, 
most funds have a large amount of “dry powder,” or cash waiting to be deployed, on hand 
because the pace of acquisition has lagged fund-raising activity.26 The large dry power stores 
influence EBIITA multiples because GPs are more likely to engage in a bidding war with a 
competing fund while pursuing limited investment opportunities. Second, GPs are facing 
increased competition for investment opportunities from strategic buyers. Global corporate 
M&A transactions topped $4 trillion in 2015, up more than 40% from 2014.27 The large spike in 
                                                 
22 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pp 4. 
23 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg 9 
24 EBITDA – Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, & amortization. LBO transactions commonly value 
potential targets by multiplying this value by the market multiple for comparable companies. 
25 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg 13 
26 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf 10 
27 Id. 11 
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M&A activity is likely caused by cash-rich corporations pursuing growth through strategically 
acquiring competitors. There is significant overlap between targets among strategic purchasers 
and financial buyers, which leads to competition during the bidding process and a subsequent 
increase in EBITDA multiple data.  
 Savvy GPs should shift to a buy-and-build strategy to avoid overpaying in the 
competitive auction landscape.28 As briefly discussed earlier, some GPs elect to increase 
revenues by making tack-on acquisitions. The buy-and-build strategy is a formalized version of 
this process, which consists of purchasing a solid player in a consolidating market. After the 
initial purchase, the GP will make several tack-on acquisitions to grow the portfolio company’s 
core business. The buy-and-build strategy is attractive because ideal tack-on acquisition 
candidates are often too small to attract the attention of the big corporate acquirers. Further, once 
the portfolio company has grown through the tack-on process, it will be large enough to attract 
the attention of corporate purchasers. This allows the GP to avoid overpaying for the asset on 
acquisition but the GP will benefit from the increased competition on the disposition of the 
asset.29 Indeed, it appears GPs are pursuing this strategy as the value of tack-on acquisitions by 
portfolio companies has doubled to a record $267 billion in 2015, which almost matches the 
$282 billion invested in buyouts.30  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf 15 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF 2015 GLOBAL DISPOSITIONS AND INVESTOR RETURNS 
 
The aggregate value of buyout-backed exits in 2105 was $422 billion across a reported 
1,166 dispositions.31 A closer look at this statistic reveals two critical signs of health. First, pre-
2010 vintages accounted for 57% of exits, a significant decrease from 76% in 2014 and 87% in 
2013. Second, the median holding period among portfolio companies in 2015 was 4.9 years, 
down from a median of 5.8 years in 2014. This indicates that funds have exited the bulk of their 
pre-2010 vintage investments, which is a sure signal that there is an abundance of exit options 
available in the market.  
Ironically, strategic acquisitions by large corporations accounted for the bulk of buyout 
backed exits in 2015. In fact, seven of 2015’s ten largest exits, including the largest - Blackstone 
and Permira’s $16.8 billion sale of Freescale Semiconductor to NXP Semiconductor, were exits 
to a strategic buyer.32 In total, roughly $280 billion of dispositions were to strategic buyers in 
2015 with an additional $84.5 billion worth of dispositions to financial buyers.33 Finally, GPs 
unloaded $60 billion worth of assets into the IPO market in 2015.34 Notably, strategic buyers 
were much more popular in North America whereas the European and Asia-Pacific markets 
preferred selling to financial buyers.35 
Private equity buyout funds outperformed the Modified Public Market Equivalent 
(“mPME”) tracking the S&P 500, the MSCI Europe and the MSCI All Country Asia indexes on 
a one-year basis in 2015.36 Cambridge Associates, a well-respected institutional investment 
                                                 
31 Id. 20 
32 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf 23 
33 Id. 
34 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf 25 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 28 
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advisor, developed the mPME benchmarking methodology to draw LPs a clearer picture of 
private equity returns compared to public equity market returns.37 The benchmark achieves 
clarity by discounting private equity returns for illiquidity and administrative expenses.38 In the 
US and Europe, private equity returns were 5% higher than their respective equity benchmarks 
and in the Asia-Pacific region returns were 6% higher. On a 10-year time horizon, private equity 
returns in the United States edged the S&P 500 by 3.7% net of fees. 39 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 http://www.cambridgeassociates.com/news/articles/new-method-for-comparing-performance-of-private-
investments-with-public-investments-introduced-by-cambridge-associates/ 
38 http://www.cambridgeassociates.com/news/articles/new-method-for-comparing-performance-of-private-
investments-with-public-investments-introduced-by-cambridge-associates/ 
39 Id. 
12 
 
IV. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC PRIVATE EQUITY 
INDUSTRY 
 
 The 2015 vital signs of the Asia-Pacific region are, as a whole, stronger than any year in 
the last decade.40 First, Asia-Pacific funds raised $50 billion in new capital.41 This number is on 
par with the 5-year average for the region.42 Next, aggregate acquisition value jumped to $125 
billion, dwarfing 2014’s previous record of $87 billion by 44%.43 Additionally, the number of 
individual transactions increased to 955, another record for the Asia-Pacific region.44 Finally, 
funds disposed of $88 billion in assets over 489 transactions despite the extreme volatility in the 
equity markets for most of 2015.45 Both numbers fall in line with their five-year historical 
averages.46 Asia-Pacific funds reported a mere 12% net internal rate of return for investors, 
which may be too low to attract investors given the higher risk in Asia-Pacific. 47 However, if the 
data is truncated to show only the top-quartile of funds, the IRR jumps to 21%.48 This implies 
that there will be a flight to quality private equity firms in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 Despite the favorable statistics, GPs face unique challenges when investing in the Asia-
Pacific region. First, it is historically uncommon for GPs to purchase controlling stakes in Asia-
Pacific companies. Second, the greater Asia-Pacific economy has stagnated.  
Buyout transactions averaged only $22 billion in value over the past five years, which is 
well under 50% of total deal value in the region for each of the last five years.49 Without a 
                                                 
40 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
41 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
42 Id. 
43 http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf pg 9 
44 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
45 Id. 
46 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
47 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
48 Id. 
49 http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/36561-36561/ 
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controlling stake, GPs cannot influence management of portfolio companies and, instead, must 
rely on a rising tide to generate returns for LPs. The current stagnation of Asia-Pacific economy 
places pressure on GPs to negotiate controlling stakes with potential targets, despite the region’s 
aversion to the idea, because GPs cannot rely on economic growth to increase revenue. Instead, 
GPs must convince management to implement cost reducing or revenue boosting strategies. This 
process may require a controlling stake in the target company because the GP will need to 
credibly threaten the incumbent management with replacement if it refuses to cooperate. 
However, it appears that GPs are negotiating successfully with the target management as there 
were $53 billion of buyout purchases in 2015, a significant jump from the 2014 number of $22 
billion. While this is an optimistic sign that Asia-Pacific directors are selling controlling stakes to 
private equity investors, this number is inflated by the overall increase in deal value in the 
region. As an alternative, some GPs have negotiated path-to-control provisions when purchasing 
minority stakes instead of pushing for a majority stake in the company.50 As of April 2016, 39% 
of minority ownership portfolio companies have such a provision.51 GPs expect this number to 
move towards 50% in the coming years.52 
 Second, the stagnation of some Asia-Pacific countries puts downward pressure on 
valuations of existing portfolio companies and confuses valuations for new investments. For new 
investment, as growth slows it becomes more difficult to predict future earnings. This leads to 
inaccuracy in EBITDA forecasting, and ultimately, overvaluation. Moreover, GPs purchased 
older vintage portfolio companies when the Asia-Pacific economy was growing. As such, the 
valuations assumed higher EBITDA values which, again, leads to overvaluation. Luckily, the 
                                                 
50 http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/36561-36561/ 
51 http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/36561-36561/ 
52 http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/36561-36561/ 
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damage from these errors can be offset by competition within the market. Indeed, competition is 
so fierce in the Asia-Pacific region that enterprise value/EBITDA multiples rose to 17.8x, a 18% 
increase from 2014, despite the lagging economy.53 Notably, the impact of the “stagnation” may 
be overestimated as real GDP growth for the Asia-Pacific as a whole is 4%, which is still well 
above the global average.54 
On balance, the 2015 Asia-Pacific private equity market vital signs are a marked 
improvement from the 5-year historical averages in the region. However, one Asia-Pacific 
country did not improve: Japan. In 2015, Japan posted a paltry $2.6 billion in acquisitions across 
31 deals – a respective decrease of 64% and 28% from the 5-year historical average.55 Moreover, 
GPs disposed of $7.9 billion in assets across 55 deals – a respective decrease of 29% and 16% 
from 5-year historical averages.56 These numbers are the smallest in the Asia Pacific both in 
terms of deal size and deal volume. Vital signs this weak paint a grim picture for private equity 
in Japan. 
V. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE JAPANESE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
Japan is the world’s third largest economy. It is a large, wealthy and sophisticated market 
with a strong rule of law and governing party committed to increasing foreign direct investment. 
Additionally, there is minimal risk of expropriation and nationalization of assets in comparison 
to other countries as Japan has an independent judiciary, consistently applied commercial law 
and strong intellectual property protections.57 Further, Japan has one of the lowest corruption 
                                                 
53 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
54 http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2016.aspx 
55 http://www.bain.com/infographics/apac-pe-2016/ 
56 http://www.bain.com/infographics/apac-pe-2016/ 
57 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241609.htm 
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indexes and one of the highest World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” scores.58 Moreover, the 
corporate tax rate will be trimmed to 29.97% in the 2016 fiscal year from 32.11% and nearly all 
foreign exchange transactions are freely permitted.59 Finally and perhaps the most tantalizing 
fact to GPs, Japan is filled with small and medium-sized enterprises which are still owned and 
operated by their founder. The average age of a CEO among these companies is between 61 and 
65.60 Reports indicate that many of these owners lack transition plans and, instead, are ready to 
sell their stakes. Despite these positives, the data shows that GPs are electing to deploy dry 
powder in Greater China and India instead of Japan. 
  There are two likely explanations for the lack of private equity investment in Japan. 
First, there is a significant risk that the Japanese economy will slip into a period of deflation. 
Second, the Japanese business culture is generally distrustful of foreign investments and 
companies are highly unlikely to sell a controlling stake to non-Japanese investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 doingbusiness.org/rankings 
59 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-tax-idUSKBN0TV02D20151212 
60 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2797523e-fcaa-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz46mBQF5S4 
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A. THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY SLIPPING INTO A PERIOD OF 
DEFLATION 
  
Japan’s economy has been in a state of stagnation, or worse deflation, since its real estate 
and stock bubble burst in the early 1990s.61 An economy contracts when it is in a state of 
deflation because consumers are incentivized to defer consumption as the cost of goods 
decreases over time.62 An economic contraction will cast doubt on future corporate earning 
power and, ultimately, lead to a decrease in valuations of portfolio companies.63 Moreover, 
deflation is a risk to private equity firms because it increases the real value of debt. As most 
portfolio companies are highly leveraged, an increase in the real value of debt can further 
dampen returns to LPs. 
B. JAPAN HAS AN INSULAR BUSINESS CULTURE AND TRADITIONALLY POOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LAW 
 
Japan’s notoriously insular business culture is a large concern for GPs considering 
investment in the country. Trust is a necessary ingredient in any business relationship, but in 
Japan the level of trust necessary before parties will conduct business together is far beyond any 
other country. For example, in the United States it is common for potential business partners to 
agree to work together after a single meeting over coffee. This is not so in Japan. There, it may 
take several meetings before a relationship is built and, still, a conservative Japanese 
businessman may be unwilling to conduct business together until a third party independently 
suggests the venture. As a result, foreign-backed firms are likely denied access to supplier 
networks and inter-business alliances of Japanese corporations because they do not devote 
                                                 
61 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040715/japans-strategy-fix-its-deflation-problem.asp 
62 Id. 
63 http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/nn/articles/Deflation-What-Investors-Need-to-Know 
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enough time to developing relationships.64 This high-touch expectation does not mesh well with 
the purchase, hold, and exit strategy of major private equity firms and requires firms to shift to a 
“longer bake” model, which requires a longer investment holding period, to meet the relationship 
demands of the business culture. This may be hard to sell to potential LPs because they are used 
to a traditional timeline of five to seven years. 
 Japanese business leaders have traditionally viewed private equity firms as vultures.65 At 
one time, this stigmatism was so severe that it was near impossible for a private equity GP to 
request an audience with a company founder.66 This fact, coupled with the high-touch 
requirement of business relationships, made investing in Japan an unattractive proposition at 
best. However, there is evidence that the devastation experienced by owners during the financial 
crisis and the dire succession situation of others has eroded the stigmatism of working with 
private equity funds.67 
Private equity firms are unlikely to invest in Japanese companies because they are often 
unable to purchase a controlling stake in the companies. Japanese companies are difficult to 
acquire for three key reasons. First, many public Japanese companies maintain the tradition of 
cross-shareholding. Second, managers can consider stakeholders other than shareholders when 
making corporate decisions under Japanese corporate law. Finally, poison pills and other defense 
measures are common in Japanese corporate charters.  
The current cross-shareholding tradition in Japan is derivative of the Japanese keiretsu 
system, which dominated the Japanese economy until the 1980s. Put simply, a keiretsu is a set of 
                                                 
64 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241609.htm 
65 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2797523e-fcaa-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz46mBQF5S4 
66 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2797523e-fcaa-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz46mBQF5S4 
67 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2797523e-fcaa-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz46mBQF5S4 
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companies, commonly suppliers, distributors, banks and insurers of a business, which purchase 
equity in each other to create an, “interlocking web” of ownership.68 Presumably, Japanese 
corporations are reducing opportunism within the supply chain and agency costs between 
shareholders and managers by aligning interests between business partners.69 More importantly, 
the investment is considered a “blood-brotherhood” in corporate Japan – a way to cement a 
business relationship – rather than an actual investment.70 Although it is an effective trust 
building exercise, cross-shareholding creates information asymmetry among shareholders, 
reduces transparency, and discourages firms from working with outsiders.71 This reinforces 
Japan’s inflexible business environment. Moreover, cross-shareholding increases the downside 
risk if the public equity market falls, as a company will lose value in its share price as well as the 
friendly shares it is holding. This is a huge issue for private equity funds, as cross-shareholding 
can quickly erase large amounts of value if the market drops, dampening returns for LPs. 
Further, Although the frequency of cross-shareholding has fallen from its peak in the ‘80s, it has 
resurged in the 2000s and 2010s.72 
Japanese manager’s penchant for strongly considering the implications of a business deal 
on its workers further complicates acquisitions in Japan. Japanese corporate law, similar to 
German corporate law, explicitly grants directors the authority to consider stakeholders other 
than shareholders when deciding if an acquisition is in the best interests of the corporation. An 
opinion survey of directors across the globe asked whether shareholder interest should be given 
priority over other stakeholders.73 An overwhelming 97% of Japanese managers disagreed with 
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the statement.74 The US and UK are quite to the contrary, with 76% and 71% of managers 
reporting that the shareholder’s interest should be given priority to other stakeholders.  
Not only does the law grant board discretion to directors to consider stakeholders, but the 
broader Japanese business culture considers worker interests pre-eminent to other stakeholders. 
In Japan, the colloquial “company man” is an actual cultural norm, as an employee is expected to 
spend his entire working life with one firm.75 Many corporations elect to continue employing 
unnecessary personal because it is a social taboo to lay off a full time worker and eliminating 
personal would have negative market repercussions. For example, the New York Times 
mockingly reported that Sony, a leading public Japanese firm, silos obsolete personnel in the 
“boredom room.”76 Additionally, entrepreneurs, likely because of their tendency to move 
between ventures, are seen as eccentrics or misfits in Japan.77  
The concept of other stakeholders, specifically workers, taking priority over the interest 
of shareholders complicates private equity in Japan because many GP cost cutting strategies 
involve eliminating redundancy in the workforce. Japanese directors may decline an offer for a 
controlling stake, even if the offer would create significant value for shareholders, because they 
do not want their workers fired from the company. GPs have limited recourse against the 
directors because of the autonomy granted to directors by the Japanese corporate code.  
The pervasive use of defensive measures, such as the poison pill, is the biggest 
impediment preventing GPs from purchasing controlling stakes in public Japanese companies. A 
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startling 20% of public firms included in the Japan Topix index have poison pill provisions in 
place. The TOPIX benchmark is composed of over 1700 publicly traded Japanese companies.78 
Comparatively, only 5.8% companies within the United States S&P 500 index have active 
poison pill provisions. Defensive measures are problematic for private equity investments 
because they can be used to force the acquirer to pay more money for a controlling stake in the 
company. If the acquirer does not agree to increase the offer price, they may be forced to 
abandon a partial stake at a significant discount.79 Further, they make pursuing a hostile takeover 
near impossible because an aggressive shareholder will trip the poison pill and dilute his stake in 
the company. 
VI. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS IMPLEMENTED SEVERAL CHANGES 
TO ENCOURAGE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Cabinet have committed to improving the Japanese 
economy and reforming Japan’s corporate code as a means to encourage direct foreign 
investment in Japan. Prime Minister Abe refers to his strategy as “The Three Arrows” but it is 
commonly referred to as Abenomics – a tip of the hat to United States President Ronald 
Reagan’s “Reaganomics” of the 1980s.80 Abe’s first arrow is a quantitative easing policy 
designed to bring cash to consumers and corporations. The second arrow is aimed to increase 
government spending in welfare, debt serving and public works.81 The third arrow, known as the 
Japanese Revitalization Strategy, calls for significant structural reform of Japan’s corporate code 
and business culture to attract private investment. The first and third arrows are of particular 
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interest to private equity fund GP because, if successful, they may ameliorate the risk of 
deflation and liberalize GPs ability to negotiated for controlling stakes. 
Prime Minister Abe’s quantitative easing plan requires the Bank of Japan to purchase 
Japanese Government bonds from financial institutions in the hope that the institutions will lend 
the new cash flow back to households and corporations.82 Theoretically, this will encourage 
spending and business expansion, thereby jumpstarting the Japanese economy and minimizing 
the risk of deflation. Although the bond buying strategy has yielded an increase in the monetary 
base and bank lending, there has been a decrease in real wages and corporate debt ratios.83 The 
lack of corporate interest in debt can easily be explained by examining the balance sheet of 
Japanese corporations - the corporations have no need to borrow money to expand business 
because they are flush with cash. In terms of cost of goods, the most recent inflation numbers 
show a meager .3% rise in overall prices compared with 2014.84 Despite this modest increase and 
the lack of corporate borrowing, Prime Minister Abe has declared that Japan is, “no longer in a 
deflationary period.”85 This declaration appears misguided, and just a few months prior, Japanese 
Economics Minister Akira Amari openly stated that it is, “too early to claim that Japan has 
escaped the risk of returning to deflation.”86 Politics aside, it is clear that there is a still a risk of 
deflation in Japan, a fact which GPs should strongly consider before investing LP capital in 
Japan. 
The third arrow, which is designed to spur private investment in Japan by reforming 
Japan’s infamous corporate governance system, is of particular interest to GPs. The policy is 
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hard to identify as it is an amalgamation of policies, but the most relevant changes are two code 
enactments, the Japanese Stewardship Code and the Japanese Corporate Governance Code, the 
creation of the JPX-Nikkei Index 400 by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and an amendment to the 
Companies Act of Japan.87  
The code enactments are a two-pronged approach to promote transparency and 
collaboration between shareholders and directors. The Japanese Stewardship Code, effective as 
of February 2014, calls on shareholders to disclose how they vote at annual meetings and engage 
actively with company management.88 Ideally, the code will create a dialogue between 
shareholders and directors which will lead to improved business operations.89 The code is 
entirely elective, but has been adopted by 127 investors, including nearly all institutional 
investors in Japan.90  
The Japanese Corporate Governance Code, effective as of June 2015, aims to make 
Japanese directors more transparent, responsive to shareholders, and subject to more effective 
oversight by boards of directors.91 The code takes a principle-based approach which gives public 
companies the autonomy to determine whether its activities are in line with each prescribed 
principle.92 Further, a company must either comply with the principles within the code or explain 
why it chose to ignore the principles in a corporate governance report which is disseminated to 
stakeholders.93 There are five general principles in the code, some of which are new and others 
which are codifications of longstanding traditions. First, directors must secure the rights and treat 
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shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders, equally.94 Second, Japanese directors 
must consider a decisions impact on all stakeholders, not just shareholders.95 Third, directors are 
expected to, “strive to actively provide information beyond that required” by law.96 Fourth, the 
code recommends that companies appoint at least two independent directors to their boards.97 If 
a company elects not to appoint two independent directors, it must explain its reasoning to its 
shareholders. 98 Finally, the code recommends that directors engage in open and constructive 
dialogue with their shareholders.  
The JPX-Nikkei Index 400, also known as the “shame index,” is a compilation of the 400 
firms in Japan with the largest return on equity.99 The idea behind the new index is that managers 
will either place a larger emphasis on return on equity or bear the shame of not being listed 
among the top performing firms in Japan. If the index works, firms will be encouraged to put 
their large cash stores to use – either by acquiring new companies or by distributing the cash out 
to shareholders – or they will be unable to compete in the market.100  Early indications show that 
the strategy is working. For example, Amada, a tool producer, has promised to return all of its 
net profits to shareholders over the next two years to improve its standing among firms.101  
 The Diet amended the Companies Act of Japan to further encourage the appointment of 
outside directors and facilitate certain transactions.102 First, the amendment requires listed 
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companies to either appoint one outside director or explain at a shareholder meeting why the 
corporation did not appoint an independent director.103 If a public company breaches its duty to 
comply or explain, then the Japanese government has the authority to take remedial action 
against the corporation, which includes mandatory appointment of an outside director. The new 
squeeze out right, which allows an acquirer to force a cash-out of minority shareholders if they 
acquire 90% of a company, is of particular interest to fund GPs.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
On balance, it is likely that Japan’s private equity market will expand in the future because 
the government has taken affirmative steps towards liberalizing controlling ownership of 
Japanese companies by foreign companies and increasing transparency between directors and 
shareholders. These preliminary changes, though modest, will begin to breakdown Japan’s 
insular business culture and encourage foreign direct investment. On a broader scale, the Asia-
Pacific region has attracted significant attention from private equity GPs but GPs, on average, 
have posted less than stellar returns. This will cause a flight of LP capital to top quartile firms, 
limiting the opportunity of non-top performing firms in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, private 
equity on a global scale remained healthy in 2015, hallmarked by record exit EBITDA multiples, 
strong additional capital commitments by LPs and a cycling of old vintage investments. 
Moreover, returns for private equity funds have outpaced other equity investment options. In 
sum, 2015 vital signs, and the preceding few years, indicate an expansion of the global private 
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equity market. The Asia-Pacific region has driven part of this growth, but Japan is nearly 
irrelevant in driving foreign direct investment in the Asia-Pacific region.  
   
 
 
